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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years of social science research has documented that implicit bias 
influences individual behaviors and group-based decisions. In reliance on this 
research, many scholars argue that Title VII’s predominant focus on 
discriminatory intent fails to regulate decisions influenced by implicit bias in 
the workplace.1 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. J.D. and M.P.A., 
University of South Carolina. The author is indebted to Anni-Michelle Jean-Pierre Amber 
Marchlowska and Ty Nagamatsu for their research assistance. Thanks to Nancy 
Ehrenreich, César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Randy Wagner, and Roberto Corrada 
for their comments.   
 1 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for 
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2018–30 (1995); 
Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of 
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95–99 (2003); Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 969 (2006); 
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1071–78 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & 
Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and 
Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1027–52 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 
1251, 1276–91 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) [hereinafter Krieger, Categories]; David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993); see also Ian 
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This short reflection Article explores the possibility of regulating implicit 
bias in the workplace by cautiously turning to tort law.2 Caution is warranted; 
we should avoid treating Title VII as the equivalent of a common law tort 
without appreciating their different purposes and objectives.3 With that in 
mind, tort law is a logical and valuable legal field to draw from. Formally, 
“[t]he purpose of the law of torts is to adjust [for] losses, and to afford 
compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct 
of another.”4 In reality, tort law does far more than compensate for injuries; it 
serves as a legal reflection of our cultural and societal values.5 As I explain to 
students, tort law is one of our most basic organizing systems for defining 
harms, and it is important, especially for those interested in civil rights work, 
to appreciate it.6 Further, the themes and values of tort law are inescapable in a 
discussion on regulating conduct outside the confines of an intentional 
discrimination framework. 
In an early critique of the intent doctrine in equal protection law, Professor 
Kenneth Karst explains: 
Racism, 1970’s-style, is a living system, just as Jim Crow was a system. The 
main difference between the two systems is that today’s racism inflicts a 
greater proportion of its harms unthinkingly. One who is stumbled over often 
enough may, understandably, notice that those cumulative impacts bear a 
certain functional resemblance to kicks.7  
Karst reminds us that both intentional and unintentional discrimination can 
co-exist and that the harms from both are not dissimilar and are detrimental to 
                                                                                                                     
Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability 
Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1996) (arguing that disparate 
impact liability may actually induce hiring discrimination against minorities); Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1496–97 (2005) (introducing the concept 
of “racial mechanics”). 
 2 Implicit bias is one of many terms used to describe this cognitive phenomenon. 
Among those terms circulating in scholarship are “behavioral bias,” “cognitive bias,” 
“unreflective bias,” “aversive racism,” “institutionally-enabled racism,” “non-deliberate 
discrimination,” “unexamined discrimination,” “unintended discrimination,” a “mechanism 
of discrimination,” “unconscious prejudice,” and “stereotyping.” 
 3 See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate 
Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination] (identifying the 
problems of incorporating proximate cause into employment discrimination law). 
 4 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5 Id. at 16 (“When the interest of the public is thrown into the scales and allowed to 
swing the balance for or against the plaintiff, the result is a form of ‘social engineering.’”). 
 6 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Tort Law’s Role as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle, 37 
WASHBURN L. J. 249, 249 (1998). 
 7 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977).  
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society. Karst’s reference to stumbles and kicks is apropos. In the “real 
world,” most tort injuries stem from elbows and stumbles, not fists and kicks.8 
Importantly, tort law recognizes causes of action for intended and unintended 
injuries in order to achieve important objectives. The tort system is a 
fundamental vehicle through which society defines legally cognizable harms 
in reliance on concepts of fault, individual and community interests, social 
values, morality, compensation, deterrence, fairness, and—especially 
important for this Article—risk-reduction.9  
Title VII, however, is hyper-focused on discriminatory intent and a seek-
and-find-the-“bad-actor” framework.10 In light of the advances in our 
understanding of implicit bias, the objectives of Title VII—to end workplace 
discrimination, compensate those discriminated against, and deter future 
violations—may be more effectively achieved by rooting out conduct in the 
workplace that poses risks of discrimination.11 As many scholars have 
contended, Title VII may better achieve its purpose by expanding its narrow 
definition of discrimination to explicitly include a negligence theory of 
recovery. After all, what constitutes discrimination has continually evolved 
and should continue to do so. Until 1964, when Title VII was enacted, an 
employer could explicitly refuse to hire individuals because of their race. In 
1971, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to include disparate impact 
claims to address employment practices.12 It was not until 1986 that the 
Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment claims as actionable.13 This 
evolving recognition of discriminatory harms should continue to include the 
developments in our understanding of how discrimination operates, including 
through conduct driven by implicit bias.14 This leads us to the looming 
                                                                                                                     
 8 Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First-Year Torts Curriculum, 54 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 511, 512 n.7 (2004) (discussing a 1992 Bureau of Justice Statistics report 
that revealed that 10,879 cases, or 2.9 percent of the tort cases, in the country’s 75 largest 
counties were intentional tort cases). 
 9 In determining which interests are actionable, the tort law system balances a 
number of factors, including the plaintiff’s claim of protection against an injury to an 
interest, the defendant’s freedom of action to achieve her objectives, and the interests of the 
community and society. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 6. 
 10 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are 
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1290–93; Krieger, Categories, supra note 1, at 1164 
(“[T]he way in which Title VII jurisprudence constructs discrimination, while sufficient to 
address the deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to address 
the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy.”). 
 11 For a discussion on the objectives of anti-discrimination laws, see Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–21 (1975). 
 12 Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 74 
(2011) [hereinafter Sperino, Rethinking] (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971)). 
 13 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).  
 14 See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 82 (explaining that “[i]n the first decades 
after Title VII’s enactment, the courts were constantly considering how to shape the law to 
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question for purposes of this Article: Is it feasible to regulate implicit bias by 
rooting out the risks of discrimination? I do not have a definitive answer; 
however, the first step is to simply ask the question.15 
Part II will offer a brief overview of Title VII’s disparate treatment 
framework and then turn to a short discussion of the legal scholarship on 
implicit bias in the workplace and how the intent requirement falls short in 
capturing it. Part III will draw upon lessons from tort law to argue in favor of a 
role for Title VII to address implicit bias. First, this part will discuss tort law’s 
focus on risk-reduction and offer a simple example to start a conversation 
about the risks of conduct that lead to workplace discrimination. Second, this 
part will briefly discuss the historical development of the torts of intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional harm as an example of the benefits of 
recognizing these concurrent claims to remedy the same class of harm. Finally, 
this part will briefly discuss the benefits of tort law’s view of negligent 
conduct as less morally blameworthy, a necessary value shift, in my view, to 
regulate implicit bias in the workplace. If everyone engages in implicit bias, 
treating it as less culpable may reduce defensiveness and minimize the 
characterization of defendants as racist or bad actors.  
II. TITLE VII AND IMPLICIT BIAS 
A. Proving Intent to Discriminate  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from 
discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of race, color, 
sex, religion and national origin.16 Courts have developed two separate tracks 
for Title VII discrimination law: disparate impact and disparate treatment.17 
Disparate impact claims, viewed as a form of strict liability, require plaintiffs 
to prove that a specific employment practice has a disproportionate effect on a 
protected group, which can only be rebutted if the employer can prove that the 
practice is a job-related business necessity.18 This Article will focus 
                                                                                                                     
handle new understandings of how discrimination occurs” but this has declined since the 
late 1980s). 
 15 For an interesting exploration of whether “unconsciously biased action fall[s] 
within the legal concept of actionable discrimination,” see Patrick S. Shin, Liability for 
Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 67, 67, 83–100 (2010). 
 16 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). The two other major 
employment discrimination statutes are the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12300 (2012). 
 17 Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 3, at 12. 
 18 Id. at 13. For the limitations of disparate impact, see Melissa Hart, Disparate 
Impact Discrimination: The Limits of Litigation, the Possibilities for Internal Compliance, 
33 J.C. & U.L. 547, 548–51 (2007). 
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exclusively on the second track disparate treatment, which is the basis for the 
majority of employment discrimination claims. 
Disparate treatment cases are classified as either a mixed-motive case or a 
single-motive case.19 The mixed-motive cases are those that offer both a 
legitimate and a discriminatory reason for the employment decision in 
question.20 If there is no mixed-motive then the case is viewed as a single 
motive case and is analyzed through the three-part McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework, which usually involves some variation of the 
following steps.21 
First, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case by showing that: (1) the 
plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified 
for a job the employer was seeking to fill; (3) the employer rejected the 
plaintiff; and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants or the position was 
filled by someone else.22 Once the prima facie case is met, a rebuttable 
presumption of discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
decision.23 If the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant’s reason was a pretext for intentional 
discrimination.24   
Although the text of Title VII simply prohibits discrimination against an 
individual “because of . . . race, color, religion, or sex,”25 courts have 
interpreted it to require discriminatory intent. Thus, both direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence regimes seek to determine whether the employer 
engaged in intentional discrimination.26 Courts have yet to explicitly adopt a 
Title VII negligence theory.27   
                                                                                                                     
 19 Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 3, at 12. 
 20 Id. at 13. As Professor Sperino explains, “[s]ome circuits will allow a plaintiff to 
make a case of discrimination without resorting to McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff has 
‘either direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional 
discrimination.’” Id. at 15 n.88 (citing Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 
563 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 21 Id. at 15–16. 
 22 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 23 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Sperino, 
Discrimination, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 24 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 3, at 15–16.  
25 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 26 Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 3, at 12. Other intentional discrimination 
frameworks under disparate treatment are harassment and pattern and practice. Id. at 13. 
 27 Id. at 13–14; Jalal v. Columbia Univ. 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(“Title VII . . . provides no remedy for negligent discrimination (if such a thing is 
possible): Only action taken with an intent to discriminate is prohibited.”). 
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 As the next section explains, the focus on intent may leave much 
workplace discrimination “because of race, color, religion, or sex” 
unregulated.28 
B. The Intent Requirement’s Failure to Capture Implicit Bias  
Many people think of discrimination as a strict dichotomy: an individual 
or system acts intentionally, which means that race is consciously used in a 
decision, or unintentionally, which means that race is not a factor in the 
decision. This “either-or approach” is reflected in Title VII discrimination law 
as well.29  
As implicit bias literature in social science and legal scholarship has 
proliferated, the either-or approach has increasingly come under scrutiny as 
failing to capture discrimination in the workplace.   
In 1987, in The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, Charles Lawrence used social science research to 
expand on the inherent flaw in the discriminatory intent requirement in equal 
protection law.30 Lawrence writes: “In short, requiring proof of conscious or 
intentional motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a 
decision is race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how the 
human mind works.”31 He then proposes two theoretical explanations for the 
unconscious nature of racially discriminatory beliefs and ideas—Freudian 
theory and cognitive psychology.32   
In 1993, in Negligent Discrimination, David Oppenheimer compiles the 
results of an array of surveys as well as field and laboratory experiments—all 
demonstrating a commitment to non-discrimination in employment by whites, 
yet upon closer scrutiny, also revealing high levels of covert racism.33 As a 
result of his compilation, Oppenheimer concludes that “a theory of 
discrimination liability that focuses on intentional wrongdoing will inevitably 
                                                                                                                     
 28 This Article will not explicitly address causation.  For exploration of causation 
generally, see Martin Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of 
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006). 
 29 Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 741, 743 (2005); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of 
Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2001); 
Flagg, supra note 1, at 2014–15; Krieger, Categories, supra note 1, at 1162 nn.2–3. 
Conversely, a number of scholars argue that Title VII does cover unconscious bias. See, 
e.g., Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 420 (2000). 
 30 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324–25 (1987). 
 31 Id. at 323. 
 32 Id. at 331–56. 
 33 Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 903–15.  
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miss the mark; it will condemn only a small percentage of the wrongful 
conduct Title VII was enacted to eliminate.”34  
In 1995, in The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, Linda Krieger lays out 
four basic assumptions of existing employment discrimination law: that 
intergroup discrimination results from discriminatory motive or intent;35 that 
unless discriminatory intent or motive is present, decision makers act 
objectively and judge rationally;36 that discrimination is something that occurs 
“at the moment a decision is made;”37 and that if an employee’s race or gender 
is playing a role in decision making, the employer will be aware of it.38 
Krieger then turns to social cognition theory to extensively debunk these 
assumptions.39 She explains that stereotyping is a normal process that stems 
from how people categorize and process information and that as a result, these 
stereotypes inevitably bias intergroup judgment and decision making.40 She 
also demonstrates that cognitive biases influence decisionmakers well in 
advance of the moment of decision and beyond the decisionmakers’ self-
awareness.41 She concludes that cognitive biases can be both unintentional and 
unconscious,42 and that these subtle forms of bias represent today’s most 
prevalent type of discrimination.43 
In 2001, in Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, Susan Sturm argues that discrimination is pervasive in structural 
and organizational practices.44 She describes this as “second generation” 
employment discrimination—that is, a more subtle and complex form of 
discrimination.45 Sturm offers a “framework that makes visible these emerging 
and converging patterns of response to second generation discrimination.”46 
                                                                                                                     
 34 Id. at 899. 
 35 Krieger, Categories, supra note 1, at 1166. In 1997, Professors Mahzarin Banaji 
(Harvard), Tony Greenwald (University of Wisconsin) and Brian Nosek (University of 
Virginia) introduced the Implicit Association Test (IAT) that measures unconscious and 
implicit attitudes held by individuals. Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan 
L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 
Association Test, 74 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998). These tests have had a 
significant impact on the level and intensity of the legal and academic dialogue on implicit 
bias.  
 36 Krieger, Categories, supra note 1, at 1167. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 1186–88. 
 40 Id. at 1188. 
 41 Krieger, Categories, supra note 1, at 1188. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. at 1164 (“[S]omething about the way the law was defining and seeking to 
remedy disparate treatment discrimination was fundamentally flawed.”). 
 44 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001). 
 45 Id. at 460–61. 
 46 Id. at 462. 
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According to Sturm, a successful structural approach must combine the efforts 
of employers, employees, lawyers, courts, and mediating organizations to 
construct a regime that encourages employers to engage in effective problem 
solving around discrimination.47 
In addition to social science developments regarding implicit bias in 
individual behavior, organizations, and structural systems, legal scholars have 
also begun to document studies about such bias displayed in group conduct as 
well. In 2002, Michelle Adams’s article, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive 
Conduct and Affirmative Action, explains the social identity theory suggesting 
that unconscious (and conscious) biases do not operate solely through 
individual action but are also influenced by group identity.48 Adams explains, 
“social science scholarship has recognized that discriminatory behaviors are 
not just the result of personal, individual cognitive-process distortions, but are 
a problem of collective action.”49 Through this process, self-identified 
members of groups engage in behaviors that lead to in-group favoritism as 
well as out-group derision.50 In my own scholarship, in The Group Dangers of 
Race-Based Conspiracies, I argue that social identification on the basis of race 
can lead to group dynamics of racial loyalty, racial persuasion, and racial 
conformity.51 The group dynamics occur even in the absence of intent. As Ann 
McGinley has explained, “as defined by the courts, ‘discriminatory intent’ 
represents an outdated view of human behavior, a view contradicted by 
overwhelming scientific evidence.”52 
For every skeptic of the intent requirement’s ability to capture the full 
range of discrimination, however, there is a believer that it is the appropriate 
solution to discrimination in the workplace.53 In 1999, Amy Wax in 
Discrimination As Accident, counters the argument that implicit bias leads to 
                                                                                                                     
 47 Id. at 463–65.  
 48 Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative 
Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2002). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 1102–03. 
 51 See generally Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based 
Conspiracies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 55 (2006). 
 52 McGinley, supra note 29, at 418; see also Chamallas, supra note 29, at 749. 
 53 See David Copus, A Lawyer’s View: Avoiding Junk Science, in EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION: BEHAVIORAL, QUANTITATIVE, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
450, 453 (Frank J. Landy ed., 2005); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, 
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1028 
(2006); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1132–33 (1999) 
[hereinafter Wax, Discrimination]; Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, 
Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 985 (2008) [hereinafter Wax, Discriminating] (“[W]hat 
really matters, and what ought to matter to law, is whether people are treated worse 
because of their race—or other protected characteristics, such as sex—in the real world.”); 
Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit 
Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 553 
(2005).  
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discriminatory decisions in the work place.54 According to Wax, because 
society does not understand implicit bias or whether this bias actually impacts 
real world decisions, the cost of trying to remedy implicit bias outweighs the 
potential positive impact of liability.55 She argues, “[s]uch biases, if they 
operate at all, may . . . affect the workplace ‘bottom line’ only erratically and 
infrequently.56 
There is an ongoing and intense debate surrounding implicit bias. Within 
this debate there are efforts to define harms, to balance the interests of 
employers and employees, to elucidate concepts of fault, and to define the 
scope of anti-discrimination law. This Article does not offer additional social 
science data to the debate; instead, in light of the literature that exists, it 
suggests that it may be helpful to contemplate a framework that seeks to 
reduce the “risks” of discrimination in the workplace. 
III. LESSONS FROM TORT LAW 
Tort law is viewed as embodying three theories of recovery—strict 
liability, intent, and negligence. Negligence is the predominant theory and its 
focus “is a matter of risk—that is to say, of recognizable danger of injury.”57 
Importantly, what is viewed a “recognizable” danger is not determined based 
on an individual actor’s state of mind but is based on the collective judgment 
of the community or society about what conduct is or is not reasonable under 
the circumstances. “In most instances, [negligence] is caused by heedlessness 
or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results which 
may follow from his act.”58 The actor faces negligence liability for causing 
injury to another based on a collective judgment that—from an external 
viewpoint that society imposes on the individual—such conduct poses 
unacceptable risks.  
As previously discussed, there is a significant gap between Title VII’s 
quest for the intentional discriminator and what we now know about implicit 
bias in the workplace. Negligence—or in keeping with our advisory to be 
cautious, at least negligence concepts—may serve as a bridge for this divide.  
A. Some Preliminary Thoughts on Regulating the Risks of 
Discrimination 
To the extent that there have been arguments in favor of a Title VII 
negligence framework, scholars have focused on negligence in the structural 
or organizational processes in which the employer allows implicit bias (or 
                                                                                                                     
 54 Wax, Discrimination, supra note 53, at 1134. 
 55 Id. at 1132–34. 
 56 Id.  
 57 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 169. 
 58 Id. 
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intentional discrimination for that matter) to go unchecked. In other words, the 
focus is primarily on the employer’s failure to take reasonable steps to reduce 
the risk of discrimination in its organizational structure or management 
training.59 I applaud these efforts. However, in this section, I will focus solely 
on the risks of discrimination in the context of a single decisionmaker and do 
so by way of example. 
In a typical negligence case, the “danger” in question is typically of a 
physical injury. The fact-finder must observe the injury at issue, make an 
assessment of the conduct that led to the injury, and then decide whether a 
reasonable person could foresee that the conduct posed risks of the same type 
or class of injury that occurred.60 The inquiry is not whether the actor intended 
or desired for the injury or its consequences to occur. The fact-finder must 
determine if there is a “risk of such consequences, sufficiently great to lead a 
reasonable person in his position to anticipate them, and guard against 
them.”61 Because the focus in negligence is whether the actor’s conduct poses 
unreasonable risks of injury, negligence is thus understood as an external, 
objective standard—it is a norm by which community members are expected 
to conduct their affairs.62 
So, how would such a negligence approach operate in workplace 
discrimination? In the face of a hiring, firing, or failure to promote “because of 
race, color, religion or sex,” the inquiry would not focus on intent to 
discriminate but would focus on whether the decisionmaker’s conduct posed 
an unreasonable risk that race was a factor in the decision. This determination 
may have a two-part inquiry. First, did the decisionmaker’s conduct create or 
foster a risk that race was a factor in his or her decision. Second, was the risk 
of race as a factor in the decision enough to be an “unreasonable” risk? An 
example is instructive. 
In Ash v. Tyson Foods, two African-American employees, Anthony Ash 
and John Hithon, sued Tyson Foods for race discrimination after they were 
passed over for promotion, and the two available slots were filled with white 
males in Tyson Food’s Gadsen, Alabama, plant.63 Upon the plaintiffs’ 
successful jury verdict for both compensatory and punitive damages, the 
federal district court granted, in part, Tyson Food’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.64 The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show 
pretext (or intentional discrimination) under the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas.65 The plaintiffs met the prima facie case, but the 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 900 (explaining the existence of negligence in 
Title VII, including disparate impact and sexual harassment law). 
 60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965) (“The actor is required to 
do what this ideal individual would do in his place.”). 
 61 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 169. 
 62 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965). 
 63 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
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defendant Tyson Foods offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the 
failure to promote Ash and Hithon. The ultimate issue in the case came down 
to whether comments by the supervisor were a pretext for intentional 
discrimination. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in part 
and reversed in part. The court reversed as to Hithon, finding that he proved 
intentional discrimination based on evidence that he was interviewed after the 
decisionmaker had already hired one of the white recipients of the job, making 
the legitimate reasons raised by employer to be pretextual.66 As for Ash, the 
court upheld his dismissal because the evidence did not establish intentional 
discrimination, including the decisionmaker’s use of the term “boy” to refer to 
Ash and other African-American employees.67 The court held that “[w]hile the 
use of [the term] ‘boy’ when modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or 
‘white’ is evidence of discriminatory intent, . . . the use of ‘boy’ alone is not 
evidence of discrimination.”68 
The United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the 
Eleventh Circuit and explained that context matters. “[I]t does not follow that 
the term, standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may depend 
on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, 
and historical usage.”69 Upon remand, despite the Supreme Court’s guidance, 
the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its position that the record did not support an 
inference of intentional discrimination.70 It found that the comments were 
“conversational” and “non-racial in context,” and no reasonable jury could 
find unlawful (i.e., intentional) discrimination.71 
The Ash facts and outcome are typical of the proof of discriminatory intent 
in circumstantial evidence cases as courts try to interpret the meaning of 
biased comments or “stray remarks.”72 How would this case by analyzed from 
a negligence approach? The central focus would be whether the 
decisionmaker’s conduct posed an unreasonable risk of race being a factor in 
Ash’s failure to obtain the promotion.73 
                                                                                                                     
 66 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 534 (11th Cir. 2005). The reasons 
were that Hithon lacked a college degree, he was a supervisor at a financially troubled 
plant, and he lacked experience outside of the plant. Id.  
 67 Id. at 533. 
 68 Id. Hithon had additional evidence to support his claim. 
 69 Ash, 546 U.S. at 456 (2006). The court also disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
position on Hithon’s arguments that he had superior qualifications than those hired, which 
was that it would not second guess the employer’s decision unless the facts “jump off the 
page.” Id. 
 70 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 71 Id. at 926. 
 72 For a history of the stray remarks doctrine see Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: 
A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. 
REV. 149, 149 (2012). 
 73 It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the different tests to assess 
unreasonableness. 
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Should the supervisor have known that his conduct created or fostered a 
risk of race being a factor in the employment decision? As with a negligence 
analysis in torts, the facts would dictate whether there was a risk and whether 
the degree of risk was low or high. The fact-finder must assess circumstances 
of the case and determine whether a risk of race being a factor was present. If 
so, the fact-finder must ask whether the risk was high enough to create an 
unreasonable risk of race being a factor in the decision.74 
In the Ash case, the “boy” comments, taken in context, including 
“inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage,”75 would go to 
the assessment of the degree of the risk of discrimination (race being a factor 
in the decision), not whether it proved intent to discriminate. The parties could 
offer evidence and arguments in support of their respective positions—the 
plaintiff would offer evidence to prove that the risk was high, while the 
defendant would offer evidence to show that the risk was low or non-existent. 
For example, as to the use of the term “boy,” a fact-finder may find that if the 
comment occurred two years prior, the risk may be lower; if it occurred every 
week, the risk could be viewed as significantly higher.  
Also, the biased comment or stray remark would not be viewed in 
isolation but in context with other factors in analyzing the risks of 
discrimination (i.e., race being a factor in the decision)—the qualifications of 
the plaintiff and the selected candidate, the evidence of lying by the defendant, 
the timing of events, shifting job requirements, whether the decisionmaker was 
the person who hired the plaintiff (same-actor inference), and other important 
facts that might be relevant.76 
Importantly, both parties could use what we know about implicit bias to 
educate the jury.77 For example, if the supervisor in Ash had objected to the 
plaintiff’s interpersonal skills as a reason to deny him the promotion, the 
plaintiff could offer social science literature to show that subjective judgments 
                                                                                                                     
 74 I avoid using the term “reasonable” because it seems incompatible with the term 
discrimination. However, it could be that the fact-finder finds that race was not sufficiently 
present to create an unreasonable risk.  
 75 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). The court also disagreed with 
the Eleventh Circuit’s position on Hithon’s arguments that he had superior qualifications 
than those hired, which was that it would not second guess the employer’s decision unless 
the facts “jump off the page.” Id. 
 76 It is interesting that the Eleventh Circuit found intentional discrimination against 
Hithon without an analysis of the boy reference. It may be that the facts were so egregious, 
it was impossible to avoid a conclusion of intentional discrimination. It may also be that it 
is easier for a court to analyze a discrimination claim when biased comments or stray 
remarks are not present.   
 77 Over time, we might see the development of a “state of the art” test for employers 
on implicit bias literature. 
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in this area are “vulnerable to stereotypic biases,” thereby increasing the risk 
that race was a factor in the decision.78 
Professor Wax argues that a negligence standard would be extremely 
difficult to execute because of causation issues, cost, and the limitations of 
human knowledge on unconscious bias.79 She warns that “[e]ven on those 
occasions when bias distorts judgment, it may do so only a little, with no 
measurable deprivation of concrete benefits or rewards. Unconscious bias thus 
may not be ‘determinative’ of a harmful outcome in every case in which it can 
be said to play a part.”80 
The concern that we do not know enough about implicit bias to explore a 
negligence theory does warrant caution. However, it is also important to 
understand that in assessing the risk of harm in negligence law in general, the 
focus is on the actors’ conduct, not state of mind. Sometimes, the actor is 
aware that his conduct poses certain risks. Even when the actor is using his 
best judgment about the risks, the actor is unaware of the risks, or the actor is 
not even subjectively capable of appreciating the risks of harm his conduct 
poses, negligence law still applies.81 As explained earlier, the actor faces 
negligence liability for causing injury to another based on a collective 
judgment—from an external viewpoint that society imposes on the 
individual—that such conduct poses unacceptable risks.  
There will be some cases in which there are no facts to demonstrate that 
there were risks of discrimination present. In those cases, the plaintiff may lose 
in a negligence claim. Yet, there will be some cases that do offer such 
evidence. The main point is that it might be valuable to allow a jury, instead of 
judges, to decide whether and when conduct poses unacceptable risks of race 
being a factor in an employment decision. 
Even in the current intentional framework as it exists, courts implicitly 
recognize that certain facts or circumstances make “race as a factor” in the 
decisionmaking process more or less likely, even though the ultimate focus is 
on discriminatory intent. For example, proof of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework itself “raises an inference of discrimination only because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based 
on the consideration of impermissible factors.”82 Similarly, under the same-
actor inference or when the defendant decisionmaker is the same person who 
                                                                                                                     
 78 Hart, supra note 29, at 748 (citing Susan Fiske et al., Social Science Research on 
Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 
1049, 1056 (1991)). 
 79 Wax, Discrimination, supra note 53, at 1153. 
 80 Id. at 1174. 
 81 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 169. 
 82 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added); see 
William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let 
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 448 (describing 
McDonnell Douglas framework as a “thinly veiled version of the tort doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur.”). 
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hired the plaintiff, the court creates a strong inference or presumption that the 
decisionmaker did not engage in intentional discrimination when firing the 
individual. These doctrines could continue to be in play but serve to answer a 
different question: Does proof of the prima facie case from McDonnell 
Douglas or of the same-actor inference make it more or less likely that race 
was a factor in the decisionmaking process? 
These are simply initial thoughts, I do not have any definitive answers as 
to the feasibility of such an approach; however, I do believe that it is worth 
asking the question.   
B. Both Intended and Unintended Discrimination as Remedies 
A second lesson from tort law that may be instructive in Title VII 
employment discrimination law is the feasibility and importance of 
recognizing both intentional and negligent theories of recovery as concurrent 
claims for the same class of injury. A clear example of this approach is in the 
area of emotional harm recovery. The torts of intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress did not develop in a vacuum; they were 
recognized because of a high priority placed on compensating individuals for 
an injury that courts viewed as real but for which a remedy was hard to come 
by under existing doctrine. As a result of the importance of addressing 
emotional harm, the courts allowed recovery and at the same time addressed 
the concerns about these torts by imposing limitations on each. 
 The point in reciting a brief history of these two torts is not to suggest 
incorporation of tort law elements into employment discrimination law but to 
draw out an important lesson from the development and coexistence of both 
intent and negligence claims as we explore whether Title VII should expand its 
reach to unintentional discrimination.  
Until the 1930s and 1940s, pure emotional harm was not actionable.83 As 
one jurist put it, “[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not 
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.”84 
In 1934, this view was reflected in the Restatement (First) of Torts, which 
simply stated that conduct “intended or likely to cause only mental or 
emotional distress is not tortious.”85 At the time, emotional harm recovery was 
available only as “parasitic” to other independent torts, such as assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, trespass, and seduction.86  
                                                                                                                     
 83 Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 126 (1990). 
 84 Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. 
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816–17 
(1990). 
 85 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1934); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense 
Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 131 (2010). 
 86 Catherine E. Smith, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow 
Targets the New Head of the Hate Hydra, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2002). 
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In 1948, a supplement to the first Restatement recognized intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as a separate tort. In 1965, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts reflected what are now the current elements of the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring proof that the defendant: 
(1) acted in an extreme and outrageous manner; (2) intentionally or recklessly 
caused emotional harm; and (3) that the plaintiff’s resulting emotional harm 
was severe.87 According to many scholars, the recognition of the tort was in 
response to advances in scientific evidence and a keen interest in expansion by 
legal academics.88 
Despite increased recognition of the intentional infliction of emotional 
harm, the negligence counterpart to that tort was slower to gain traction. A 
plaintiff who suffered a physical impact from negligent conduct could recover 
for pain and suffering and other forms of emotional harm but there was no 
recovery for emotional harm alone.89 Over time, states eliminated the physical 
impact requirement and required a physical injury or physical manifestation. 
In order to recover for emotional injury, the plaintiff had to exhibit some 
physical symptoms of her distress, such as vomiting, neuroses, psychoses, 
depression, heart attack, miscarriage, and nightmares.90 Eventually, states not 
only recognized “direct” claims of emotional harm, but also allowed 
“bystander” or “indirect” claims, in which a plaintiff suffers emotional harm 
from observing the serious injury or death of a family member.91 
Today, both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are 
recognized in the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the majority of states.92 
Both of these torts faced resistance from skeptical jurists and academics who 
questioned (and continue to question) the legitimacy of emotional harm, the 
feasibility of regulating it, and its potential to lead to unlimited expansion of 
liability.93  
 
When defining harms to individuals and society, the law should avoid 
placing the difficulty of proof over fairness and equality. As William Prosser 
and Robert Keeton explain: 
It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of 
tort law and the primary factor influencing its development. It is perhaps 
more accurate to describe the primary function as one of determining when 
                                                                                                                     
 87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). 
 88 Rapp, supra note 85, at 132–33. 
 89 Id. at 138. 
 90 Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 84, at 820; Rapp, supra note 85, at 138. 
 91 Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 84, at 821; Rapp, supra note 85, at 138–40. 
 92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 45–
46 (2012). 
 93 Rapp, supra note 85, at 126–30 (listing five policy concerns for the expansion of 
emotional harm recovery). 
1222 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
compensation is to be required. Courts leave a loss where it is unless they 
find good reason to shift it.94 
The tort system’s response to concerns about emotional harm recovery 
was not that it was the “natural result of social existence, and that those who 
suffer it should grin and bear it.”95 The response was to develop a legal 
framework that attempted to compensate for a legitimate injury while at the 
same time responding to concerns by proceeding cautiously.96  
As the court in one of the seminal cases on the recognition of pure 
emotional harm recovery stated, “the fear of an expansion of litigation should 
not deter courts from granting relief in meritorious cases; the proper remedy is 
an expansion of the judicial machinery, not a decrease in the availability of 
justice.”97 Instead, advanced scientific developments that gave the courts a 
greater understanding of emotional injuries afforded shifts in the elements 
required to prove each tort. For example, the physical impact requirement was 
replaced by the physical injury or physical manifestation rule to address the 
fear of fake claims and the flood of litigation. As the science on psychological 
harm has advanced, the physical manifestation rule has been liberalized as 
well.98 The emotional harm torts continue to evolve as our understanding of 
emotional suffering improves and a social commitment to reducing emotional 
injury deepens. 
As for Title VII, the eradication of workplace discrimination on the basis 
of protected categories is an explicit federal mandate. The statute has two basic 
purposes: “to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary to public 
policy and harmful to society as a whole” and “to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”99 There 
are certainly good reasons to shift the loss from victims of implicit bias 
discrimination to the discriminatory actors and employers. Like the 
development of both intentional and negligent claims for emotional distress, 
the courts can begin the process of developing a negligence theory with 
appropriate limitations to address expansion concerns and over time shift the 
test as our understanding of implicit bias and workplace discrimination 
evolves.  
Further, importing implicit bias into the employment discrimination 
regime will incentivize employers to study and develop expertise and 
arguments on practices that reduce implicit bias in the workplace.   
                                                                                                                     
 94 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 20 (footnote omitted). 
 95 Rapp, supra note 85, at 127.  
 96 Love, supra note 83, at 126–27 (explaining Prosser’s redraft of Section 46 was “to 
keep the courts from running wild on this thing” and to “spell out some boundaries, 
qualifications and limitations” to the tort). 
 97 Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. 1965). 
 98 Rapp, supra note 85, at 126. 
 99 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264–65 (1989) (O’Connor J., 
concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). 
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C. The Importance of Shifting Moral Blame 
Third, importantly, the torts of intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress are not mutually exclusive. They are both actionable and 
serve to comprehensively regulate emotional harm. Both torts seek to protect 
mental tranquility and peace of mind, and they serve different roles in doing 
so. In most jurisdictions, the two torts are not viewed as mutually exclusive of 
one another. We do not have to pick just one. This more comprehensive 
approach of recognizing both intentional and negligence claims is instructive 
for regulation of discriminatory harms. 
The intentional torts require an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of 
the defendant to determine whether he desired the consequences, or had 
substantial certainty that the consequences might occur.100 Because of the fault 
underlying these torts, intentional tortfeasors are often viewed as morally 
culpable. This moral theme is reflected in the availability of more extensive 
liability under proximate cause, fewer affirmative defenses, nominal damages, 
and punitive damages.  
While the intentional torts are viewed as morally blameworthy, negligence 
law is not viewed in the same way. Instead, the failure to conform one’s 
behavior to the reasonable person is not as loaded with moral judgment or 
derision. All of us engage in unreasonable conduct. Our system of negligence 
law makes the conduct actionable when it lines up with particular elements of 
duty, breach, causation, and damages. It is significant that, generally, 
negligence offers a less morally blameworthy cause of action to address 
unintended conduct. The reduction of blameworthiness attributed to 
individuals and institutions may go a long way towards addressing 
discriminatory harms in the workplace. If Title VII explicitly regulates implicit 
bias by adopting a negligence framework, it is imperative that it endorse a 
similar shift in how society views discrimination. The law can maintain the 
moral judgment of intentional actors who consciously use race or other 
protected categories to deny equal opportunity. For those who do not harbor 
such conscious biases and are simply being human by engaging in implicit 
bias, the objective should be one of compensation for the resulting injury and 
deterrence, free from heavy moral judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Tort law plays a powerful role in defining cognizable harms and allocating 
responsibility based on concepts of fault, individual and community interests, 
social values, morality, compensation, deterrence, and notions of fairness. So, 
the idea that it may serve as a source of guidance in employment 
discrimination law, and in particular, in one of the most intractable debates 
                                                                                                                     
 100 Some intentional torts include the additional definition of reckless whether the 
defendant was aware of a high degree of risk and disregarded it. 
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within employment discrimination jurisprudence—the requirement of 
discriminatory intent—is not “unreasonable.”101 To shift from an intentional 
discrimination mindset to one focused on risks of discrimination will not be 
easy. Hopefully, this brief inquiry has offered some food for thought. 
                                                                                                                     
 101 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 (“New and nameless torts are being recognized 
constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first 
impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action, where 
none had been recognized before.”). 
